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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, and ROBERT K. JARVIK, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
No. 930064-CA 
Priority 15 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack (the 
"Maacks") submit the following Appellants1 Reply to Jarvik1s Brief: 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
The only determinative constitutional provision, statute, 
ordinance or rule is U.R.C.P. 56, which is attached as Exhibit "A." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an appeal from a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein 
the District Court held that there existed "no genuine issue of any 
material fact" and that Jarvik was entitled to judgment on all 
issues as a matter of law. The principal claims were as follows: 
1. Builder? s Warranty: There is no dispute of fact that 
JarvikTs real estate agent, Maclyn Kesselring, represented that the 
home was subject to a "builder's warranty" covering all defects in 
the construction. The warranty did not run between Jarvik and the 
buyers; it ran between the builder (Hoagland) and the buyers and, 
therefore, was not included in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Although the Buyers1 Complaint alleged recovery on theories of 
contract, estoppel, misrepresentation, negligent and/or intentional 
non-disclosure, breach of duty or good faith and fair dealing, the 
District Court held the misrepresentation regarding the "builder's 
warranty" was irrelevant because the parol evidence rule would not 
permit evidence of misrepresentation in the negotiations and 
because the Maacks were not "justified" in relying upon the agent's 
misrepresentation. The Earnest Money Contract did contain a 
provision allowing for a preclosing "inspection" of the home. The 
evidence showed the Maacks waived their right of inspection in 
reliance on the "builder's warranty". Nevertheless, the District 
Court held as a matter of law that the Maacks were not justified in 
their reliance. 
2. Fraudulent Concealment: There is no dispute that the 
builder (Hoagland) and the owner (Jarvik) discussed the fact that 
the exterior stucco materials Jarvik selected for the house 
(because it was cheap) were not proper building materials for a 
Utah (i.e., a freeze/thaw) climate. There is no dispute that prior 
to listing the house for sale, the builder (Hoagland) and the owner 
(Jarvik) determined that they had a major problem with excessive 
cracking in the stucco on the exterior surface of the home. There 
is no question that prior to listing the home for sale they decided 
to apply a "skim coat" of stucco like material to hide and conceal 
the excessive cracking in the stucco. Thereafter, the home was 
2 
listed for sale with the stucco cracking problem concealed. There 
is evidence in the record that the cost of repairing the stucco 
problem alone exceeded $50,000. Plaintiffs contended that hiding 
the defects in the stucco constitutes a fraudulent concealment in 
light of the fact that Jarvik disclosed some of the minor problems 
in the stucco but not the major ones. 
The Court held as a matter of law that the terms of the 
Earnest Money Agreement totally exculpated Jarvik from all 
liability for affirmative acts of fraud or concealment of the 
defects. In short, the District Court determined that the "as is" 
provision in the Earnest Money Agreement is a total shield to any 
conduct on the part of the seller. The Maacks respectfully suggest 
that the "as is" clause is not a resurrection of the caveat emptor 
doctrine and that in this case the seller, Jarvik, has exceeded the 
protection of the "as is" clause with his representation as to the 
"one year builder's warranty" and his affirmative "concealment" of 
defects. 
The Parol Evidence Rule contains an exception for fraud. 
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove fraud. A contractual 
provision cannot protect a person against his own fraud. JarvikTs 
misrepresentation concerning the "builder's warranty" through his 
agent is not the only issue in this case. Jarvik intentionally 
concealed defects in the exterior stucco. He disclosed some 
defects, but actively hid the remaining substantial latent defects. 
3 
Not only did the Maacks have claims against Jarvik based upon 
misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment, but the facts also 
support a claim against Jarvik based upon his breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a covenant in every 
contract entered into in the State of Utah, the breach of which 
allows for a separate cause of action. 
Jarvikfs Brief is a confession that disputed material facts 
exist, precluding the entry of summary judgment. The record amply 
supports the existence of the Maacks1 version of the facts 
establishing fraud and fraudulent concealment. 
The determination of whether the Maacks were negligent at all, 
let alone reaching the point of a legal conclusion that their lack 
of diligence barred their claims, is something that is factually 
intense and cannot be resolved on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, the Maacks were entitled to rely upon Maclyn 
Kesselring, a reputable real estate agent. She is under a 
statutory obligation to avoid making any substantial 
misrepresentation concerning the existence of a "builder's 
warranty." 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE "AS IS" PROVISION IN THE EARNEST 
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT AND THE PAROL 
EVIDENCE RULE CANNOT SHIELD JARVIK 
FROM A FRAUD CLAIM. 
Point II of Jarvikfs Brief on pages 15 through 18 essentially 
makes an argument that the Earnest Money Sales Agreement is an 
integrated contract, the Parol Evidence Rule precludes "extrinsic 
evidence concerning prior or contemporaneous conversations, 
representations or statements," and the "as is" clause, inspection, 
warranty provisions of the sales agreement are clear and 
unambiguous, and preclude the Maacks from proceeding in this case. 
In Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court made it clear that fraud is an exception to the Parol 
Evidence Rule: 
The parol evidence rule as a principle of 
contract interpretation has a very narrow 
application. Simply stated, the rule operates 
in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms and an 
integrated contract. . . . 
This general rule as stated contains an 
exception for fraud. Parol evidence is 
admissible to show the circumstances under 
which the contract was made or the purpose for 
which the writing was executed. This is so 
even after the writing is determined to be an 
integrated contract. Admitting parol evidence 
in such circumstances avoids the judicial 
enforcement of a writing that appears to be a 
binding integration but in fact is not. 
5 
What appears to be a complete 
and binding integrated agreement may 
be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an 
agreement without consideration, or 
it may be voidable for fraud, 
duress, mistake, or the like, or it 
may be illegal. Such invalidating 
causes need not and commonly do not 
appear on the fact of the writing. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 
comment C (1981). 
Id. at 665 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P. 2d 
602 (Utah 1974), found that a contractual provision limiting the 
plaintiff's remedy did not bar a fraud action: 
[A] contract clause limiting liability will 
not be applied in a fraud action. The law 
does not permit a covenant of immunity which 
will protect a person against his own fraud on 
the ground of public policy. A contract 
limitation on damages or remedies is valid 
only in the absence of allegations or proof of 
fraud. 
Id. at 608 (emphasis added). The law in other states is 
consistent.1 
Further, there is only a rebuttable presumption that the 
Earnest Money Sales agreement, which on its face appears to be an 
integrated agreement, is what is appears to be.2 The Maacks have 
demonstrated, and Jarvik has conceded, that not all of the 
1
 Lusk Corp. v. Burgess, 85 Ariz. 90, 332 P. 2d 493, 495 
(1958); P.E.A.C.E. Corp. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 568 P. 2d 
1273, 1276 (Okl. 1977); Moore v. Swanson, 556 P.2d 1249, 1253 
(Mont. 1976). 
2
 Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). 
6 
agreements between the parties concerning the purchase of the 
property are contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. For 
example, Jarvik conceded that his agent was authorized to point out 
the defects in the parapet stucco and assure any potential buyer 
that those would be remedied. The Maacks have also established, 
and the record does not contradict, the representation made to them 
concerning the builder's warranty, upon which they relied in not 
obtaining an inspection. These facts establish that there is at 
least a dispute as to whether the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
was, as it purported on its face to be, an integrated contract. 
The record does not include a specific factual determination that 
it was, or was not, an integrated contract. That alone virtually 
mandates a reversal of this case.3 
Jarvik?s argument, misconstruing Utah law to allow the 
commission of fraud is as long as an "as is" or similar clause as 
contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, is an example of 
his predatory approach in dealing with the Maacks. He incorrectly 
assumed that as long as he had an "as is" clause, anything he or 
his agent said or did or anything that he intentionally concealed 
would be blessed by the judicial system. 
There is a factual dispute as to whether Kesselring's 
misrepresentation to the Maacks was made before or after the Maacks 
Id. at 665-66. 
7 
signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement.4 Paragraph B of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement states as follows: 
B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said 
property upon Buyer's own examination and 
judgment and not by reason of any 
representation made to Buyer by Seller or the 
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its 
condition, size, location, present value, 
future value, income herefrom or as to its 
production. Buyer accepts the property in "as 
is" condition subject to Seller's warranties 
as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer 
desires any additional inspection, said 
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but 
arranged for and paid for by Buyer. 
(R. 1844; emphasis added). This language specifically does not 
address the "builder's warranty," being limited to precluding 
reliance upon representations "as to its [referring to the 
properties] condition, size, location, present value, future value, 
income herefrom or as production." The prohibition in the 
inspection clause, therefore, does not cover the representation 
that was made. It does not say that the Buyers cannot rely upon 
any representation the sales agent makes. Further, the last 
sentence in the clause must be construed to give it meaning; it 
cannot be construed in such a way as to write it out of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement.5 If the Maacks had the right to an 
C.f. Affidavit of Robert D. Maack in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Robert K. 
Jarvik ir 4 (R. 1760) with the Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring 1Mr 7 
& 8 (R. 1841-42). 
5
 Verhoof v. Askiton, 740 P. 2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987). 
8 
additional inspection, and Kesselring made the representation as to 
the builder's warranty after the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was 
signed, as she contends, then the proper reading of this language 
would require that the Maacks be allowed to back out of or 
renegotiate the deal if the inspection reveals material defects. 
To construe it otherwise would essentially read it out of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, making this post-execution right of 
inspection meaningless. 
POINT II. 
THE COVENANT GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING IS INDEPENDENT OF OTHER 
CLAUSES CONTAINED IN THE EARNEST 
MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every 
contract, and the breach of this covenant is a separate cause of 
action, independent of a claim for breach of the express provisions 
of the contract. This cardinal principle exists beyond any 
reasonable debate in Utah.6 
The application of the good faith covenant is not selective on 
a case-by-case basis, depending upon the facts and contractual 
language in any given case, as Jarvik mistakenly suggests. 
Instead, it exists in every contract, regardless of the nature of 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict' s Hosp. , 811 P.2d 
194 (Utah 1991); Resource Management Co. v. Western Ranch and 
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985); Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. 
Isom, 677 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). 
9 
the contract or the facts presented. The treatise Corbin on 
Contracts observes: 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
a constructive condition imposed on all 
contracts and, as such, has nothing to do with 
implied terms. As a requirement of law, such 
conditions are always to be seen as in the 
contemplation of the parties, and 
justification for them in the contract 
language need not be looked for. 
3 Corbin on Contracts 1f 541 at 85 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). 
Jarvik suggests that clauses in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, as a matter of law, preclude the Maacksf claim based 
upon the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as if it was not 
a condition the parties contemplated.7 Substantial evidence, 
however, supports the conclusion that Jarvik in fact breached the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Jarvik knew of 
substantial defects in the exterior stucco. He was warned against 
the use of a cement-based stucco in the Salt Lake City climate, 
insisted that it be used nevertheless, insisted that it be 
improperly applied without expansion joints, and then ordered the 
contractor to skim coat it when the inevitable cracks appeared in 
the surface of the stucco so that the defect would not be 
detectable by a prospective purchaser. He then disclosed to the 
Maacks the existence of some minor defects in the exterior stucco. 
Specifically, those defects in the parapet over the garage, but 
7
 JarvikTs Brief at 1-2 (Statement of Issue No. 1) and at 
18. 
10 
failed to disclose the remaining, substantial defects, that shortly 
after the Maacks purchased the house require the replacement of all 
the exterior stucco. He intentionally gave the Maacks the 
impression that they were buying a well-built home. He knew that 
it was not properly constructed, that it was constructed in 
violation of the plans and specifications, and yet he did not 
disclose any of those facts. Nevertheless, Jarvik asserts that the 
"as is" clause relieves him from liability for breaching the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
POINT III. 
JARVIKfs CLAIMS THAT THE MAACKS HAVE 
IMPROPERLY "RAISED UNCONTESTED 
FACTS" AND THAT THE MAACKS1 CLAIM 
THAT JARVIK IS LIABLE UNDER TORT LAW 
IS "BASED ON FALSE STATEMENTS" ARE A 
CONFESSION OF ERROR IN THE 
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DISTRICT 
COURT. 
A. Jarvik Concedes the Existence of Disputed Material Facts. 
JarvikTs Brief at 15 makes the unorthodox suggestion that the 
Summary of Judgment in his favor should be summarily affirmed 
because the Brief of Appellants raises "numerous allegations which 
are not uncontested facts and are extraneous."8 Jarvik also 
suggests that the "claim that Dr. Jarvik is liable under tort law 
8
 Jarvikfs Brief at 15. 
11 
because he made fraudulent assertions through his realtor, Maclyn 
Kesselring" is false.9 
These two assertions conclusively demonstrate that the entry 
of a Summary Judgment against the Maacks was inappropriate: (1) 
the existence of disputed material facts precludes the entry of a 
summary judgment under U.R.C.P. 56; and (2) the only way a disputed 
factual assertion can be proven "false" is after a trial on the 
merits, which would preclude the entry of summary judgment in 
either party's favor. 
Jarvik goes on to make the ludicrous assertion that the facts 
supporting the fraud claims against him were false as demonstrated 
by the District Court's finding as stated in its Rule 52 
statement.10 Obviously, in deciding a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the District Court is precluded from making findings of 
fact based upon contested matters. 
Finally, Jarvik suggests that there was no evidence of defect 
is included among the undisputed facts the Trial Court considered 
9
 Jarvik?s Brief at 21. 
10
 JarvikTs Brief at 21-22. Jarvik also complains he was 
not given an opportunity to review his deposition transcript, 
claiming that this was the Maacks? fault for some reason. Jarvik?s 
Brief at 9. First, the citations are to facts undisputed before 
the Trial Court. Jarvik never contradicted the facts supported by 
the deposition cites. Second, Jarvik was represented by counsel at 
that time. If there was a problem, his counsel should have cured 
it. Third, the basis for establishing Jarvik?s fraud is from 
Hoaglandfs deposition where Hoagland testified that he told Jarvik 
that switching to a cement-basea stucco was inappropriate and that 
Jarvik ordered the cracked stucco to be skim coated. Finally, 
Jarvik waived the right to review the deposition transcript by not 
returning it within thirty days pursuant to U.R.C.P. 30(e). 
12 
in granting summary judgment in his favor. To the contrary, a 
quick review of the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K. 
Jarvikfs Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts (R. 
1949-52) demonstrates that the defects concerning the stucco were 
placed before the District Court.12 Jarvik did nothing to dispute 
those additional material facts raised in opposition to his Motion 
for Summary Judgment.13 
B. Jarvik Did Not Raise Any Issue Relating to the Maacks? 
Diligence in the Memorandum in Support of His Motion for 
Summary Judgment or in His Reply, but Raised the Issue 
Surreptitiously by Sending a Letter to the Court Without 
Copying the Maacks f Counsel. 
On the issue of the Maacks1 due diligence, an interesting 
sequence of events developed in the hearings held before the 
District Court on May 6 & 7, 1992.14 Jarvik's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment were both filed on March 27, 1992 (R. 1616-32). On that 
same day, this Court decided Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135 
(Utah App. 1992). Not surprisingly, Jarvik's Motion for Summary 
Judgment does not raise any issue concerning the Maacks1 diligence, 
Jarvik f s Brief at 9. 
12
 Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the Additional Material 
Facts of the Memorandum in Opposition to Robert K. Jarvikfs Motion 
for Summary Judgment (R. 1949-52). 
13
 Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Robert K. JarviK*s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
zuoy*"^ iz ) . 
14
 Court Proceedings Transcript Volumes II & III (R. 2355-
2464). 
13 
and therefore, the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K. 
Jarvik's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1948-63) did not address 
that issue. Jarvik did not even bother to raise the diligence 
issue in his Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant Robert K. Jarvik's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 2039-42) filed on April 29, 1992.15 
The first time Jarvik raised the diligence issue was in a 
surreptitious letter to the District Court enclosing a copy of the 
Klas v. Van Wagoner case, but not copying any counsel of record on 
that letter.16 Nevertheless, the issue was argued, with the 
Maacks bringing to the Courtf s attention certain facts relevant to 
the issue, including Jarvik's intentional concealment of the 
defects in the exterior stucco by ordering Hoagland to skim coat 
it.17 For Jarvik to complain that insufficient evidence exists in 
the record to dispute the diligence issue is outrageous given the 
fact that it was raised for the first time in an improper ex parte 
Even raising the diligence issue on the Reply Memorandum 
would be improper. E.g., White v. Kent Medical Center, Inc., 61 
Wash. App. 163, 810 P. 2d 4,8 (1991). The Maacks objected to going 
forward with Jarvik's Motion for Summary Judgment. Court 
Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines 19-25 & 1-8) (R. 
2357-58). 
16
 Court Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines 
19-25 & 1-8). 
17
 Court Proceedings Transcript Volume III at 133 (lines 5-
16). 
14 
communication with the Court by his letter to the Judge dated May 
5, 1992, one day before the scheduled hearing.18 
C. The Record Supports the Existence of the Maacks' Version 
of the Facts Establishing Fraud. 
Jarvik criticizes the Brief of Appellants for not properly 
citing the record under U.R.C.P. 24.19 Jarvik then goes on to 
cite many of the same portions of the records as cited in the Brief 
of Appellants to support his own position. Most notable is the 
Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring (R. 1841-42).20 The Court should 
also note that Jarvik?s Brief makes many factual assertions without 
any citation to the record. If the factual assertion in Jarvikfs 
Brief falls under the definition of hyperbole, and in many 
locations where it does not, there is simply no citation to the 
record to support his facts. 
The Affidavit of Maclyn Kesselring clearly establishes that 
she represented to the Maacks that a builder's warranty existed. 
She also informed the Maacks that the stucco on the parapets was 
defective and that Jarvik would repair it. Without any citation to 
the record, Jarvik contends that this representation to the Maacks 
The date of Jarvik fs letter is only one day before the 
May 6, 1992, hearing where it was raised for tne first time. Court 
Proceedings Transcript Volume II at 36-37 (lines 19-25 & 1-3). 
Furthermore, while every other letter sent to the Court appears in 
the record, for some reason Jarvikfs letter has been omitted. 
19
 Jarvik's Brief at 15. 
20
 This affidavit is cited in Jarvikfs Brief at 21 n.24. 
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through their realtor was limited and describes in detail how the 
defective stucco would be fixed: 
He informed the Maacks via his realtor that he 
had ordered a metal flashing cap (at $1,200 
including installation) for the parapet around 
the garage and that he would go ahead and pay 
for it since work on it was in progress.21 
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the 
representation was so limited. 
Further, Jarvik does nothing to dispute the following facts: 
1. Jarvik wanted to save money and therefore ordered 
Hoagland to use a cement-based stucco, as opposed to the 
acrylic stucco;22 
2. Hoagland told him that the cement-based stucco was 
inappropriate for the climate and would deteriorate 
rapidly;23 
3. Jarvik ordered Hoagland to install the cement-based 
stucco without expansion joints, despite Hoagland?s 
21
 Jarvik*s Brief at 24. This constitutes a judicial 
admission. Brenteson Wholesale, Inc. v. Arizona Public Service 
Co., 166 Ariz. 519, 803 P.2d 930 (Ariz. App. 1990). See Utah R. 
App. P. 40(a). 
22
 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert K. Jarvik?s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts 1MF 1-4 (R. 
1949-50); Jarvik did not dispute these facts in the Memorandum in 
Reply to Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Robert 
K. JarvikTs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 2039-42). 
23
 Id. (R. 1950). 
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protest that was an improper installation technique;24 
and 
4. At Jarvikfs direction, Hoagland applied a skim-coat over 
the cracks in the stucco so that they could not be seen 
by a potential buyer.25 
D. Jarvik!s Intent to Fraudulently Conceal is Supported by 
the Record. 
Jarvikfs intentional fraudulent concealment is demonstrated in 
three aspects of the record. First, the builder of the home, 
Hoagland, told him that applying a cement-base stucco in this 
climate without expansion joints was improper and would result in 
a defective stucco application. Second, after the defects in the 
stucco started to appear, based on Hoaglandfs prediction, Jarvik 
ordered that they be skim-coated; inferentially, a jury could 
conclude that the purpose of the skim-coating was to conceal the 
defects from a potential buyer. Third, after Jarvik made a partial 
disclosure of the defects in the stucco in the parapet over the 
garage, he was under an obligation to make a complete disclosure of 
all of the facts. While he may not have spoken directly to Maclyn 
Kesselring, he certainly did talk to Eager & Associates and 
Memorandum in Opposition to defendant Robert K. Jarvik?s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Additional Material Facts 1Mf 1-4 (R. 
1949-50); Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Third-Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Fact If 6 (R. 
1995); Court Proceedings Transcript Volume III at 133 (lines 5-14 
(R. 2454). 
25
 Court Proceedings Volume III at 133 (lines 1-16) (R. 
2454). 
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instructed them to disclose the defect in the parapets and his 
intentions to repair those for the new buyer. 
Jarvik goes on to cite as authority Restatement Second of 
Torts § 551(2)(b) (1977).26 This, undoubtedly, is the law in 
Utah, something even Jarvik must concede.27 While admittedly it 
is a disputed fact as to whether Jarvik knew of the defects in the 
stucco, Jarvik cannot resolve that issue by merely asserting that 
he did not know. Jarvik's Brief at 24 admits that "[h]e informed 
the Maacks via his realtor that he had ordered a metal flashing cap 
(at $1,200 including installation) for the parapet around the 
garage and that he would go ahead and pay for it since work on it 
was in progress." This was the work that was necessary to repair 
the defective stucco. Hoagland told Jarvik that the rest of the 
stucco was defective. Jarvik did not disclose that critical fact 
to the Maacks. 
POINT IV. 
WHETHER THE PURPORTED NEGLIGENCE OF 
THE MAACKS PRECLUDE THEIR CLAIMS 
AGAINST JARVIK ONLY CAN BE RESOLVED 
BY THE TRIER OF FACT. 
Jarvik asserts that "[t]he trial court concluded that the 
plaintiffs' did not act with due diligence and that plaintiffs did 
26
 Jarvikfs Brief at 24; Brief of Appellants at 44. 
27
 First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Banberry Development 
Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Utah 1990). 
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not, in fact, rely on the 'builders warranty' representation." 
Finding that the Maacks did not act with due diligence is 
tantamount to concluding that they were negligent. Generally, 
summary judgment is improper on the issue of negligence.29 The 
only authority that Jarvik cites for this proposition is Klas v. 
Van Wagoner, 829 P. 2d 135 (Utah App. 1992). The Klas v. Van 
Wagoner case was an appeal from a three-day trial. Id. at 136. One 
of the defendants, Mark 0. Van Wagoner, is an attorney. Jarvikfs 
assertion that Mr. Maack is an attorney is correct.30 The key 
factual dispute in Klas v. Van Wagoner "was an apparent 
misunderstanding between the defendants [the Van Wagoners] and 
Carol [Klas] regarding the 'appraisals.'" Id. at 137. The Van 
Wagoners understood the term to mean formal, written appraisals, 
and Carol Klas indicated that she was considering any opinion, 
whether verbal or written, given as to the value of the property, 
to be an "appraisal." 
The Klas v. Van Wagoner case was not a trial based upon fraud. 
Rather, the primary legal principle upon which the case was decided 
was unilateral mistake and the remedy sought was rescission. This 
28
 Jarvik's Brief at 18-19. 
29
 Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d 458, 461 (Utah App. 
1991). 
30
 The suggestion in Jarvik's Brief that Mr. Maack "is a 
lawyer with experience in commercial matters," whatever that means, 
is not supported by footnote 22 in Jarvik's Brief citing the Notice 
of Appearance of Counsel Robert Maack (R. 322-23). 
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was not a case involving fraudulent concealment or breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. The discussion of the buyer's 
diligence, a necessary element to sustain rescission on the grounds 
of unilateral mistake, clearly indicates that the representations 
made to the Van Wagoners did not discourage them from obtaining 
their own "appraisal." Furthermore, the clear basis for the 
decision was that not every unilateral mistake entitles the buyer 
to relief, suggesting that the Van Wagoners "bore the risk of a 
mistake as to the value of the property." Id. at 141 n.8. 
Finally, while the Utah Court of Appeals did affirm the dismissal 
of the Van Wagoner's counterclaim for fraud and 
misrepresentation,31 whether the Maacks' actions in this case rose 
the level of ordinary diligence is a factually intensive issue 
capable of resolution only through a trial. 
Maclyn Kesselring is a reputable real estate agent. She was 
under a statutory obligation to avoid making any substantial 
misrepresentation,32 something upon which the Maacks are entitled 
to rely. The Rule of Caveat Emptor does not apply to those dealing 
with licensed real estate agents. A real estate agent hired by the 
31
 Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141 n.9 (Utah App. 
1992). 
32
 Maclyn Kesselring's real estate license is subject to 
suspension or revocation if she is found guilty of "making any 
substantial misrepresentation" or "making any false promises of a 
character likely to influence, persuade or induce." Utah Code 
Anno. § 61-2-ll(l)&(2)(1991). 
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vendor is expected to be honest, ethical, and competent and is 
answerable at law for breaches of his or her statutory duty to the 
public,33 Kesselring assured the Maacks that there was a 
builder's warranty, but did not disclose the name of the builder. 
There was no independent basis from which these facts could be 
derived by any reasonable inquiry on the Maacksf part because 
Kesselring and Jarvik were in sole possession of the underlying 
facts necessary to investigate the claim. Whether an investigation 
is necessary at all under these circumstances and, if necessary, 
how thorough that investigation needed to be, are factual disputes 
a jury needs to resolve. With Jarvik living in New York, to simply 
suggest that the Maacks should have requested a copy of the 
builder's warranty is the sort of determination that can only be 
made after a trial in this case. 
Jarvik concedes that his agent, Kesselring, represented to the 
Maacks that a builder's warranty existed. The representation that 
a builder's warranty existed discouraged the Maacks from exercising 
their right to inspect the property prior to closing. That was the 
intent of the representation. He concedes that no such warranty 
existed. To suggest that a licensed real estate agent can make 
false representations and the buyer is under an obligation to 
ferret out what is true from what is false, at his peril, is 
inconsistent with the principle that buyers should not be defrauded 
33
 Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). 
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and that contracts should be negotiated in good faith. To accept 
Jarvik!s position that the buyer's diligence can be resolved on a 
motion for summary judgment would invite sharp business practices 
and numerous false representations to be made in the course of 
sales transactions in this State. Unless this Court is prepared to 
conclude, as a matter of law, that every representation a real 
estate sales agent or any sales person makes requires the buyer, as 
a matter of being reasonably diligent, to have that oral 
representation backed up in writing, then the trial court's ruling 
must be reversed. 
Furthermore, Jarvik's misrepresentation concerning the 
"builder's warranty" is not the only issue in this case. Jarvik 
revealed a portion of the defects in the stucco, while concealing 
the remaining, major defects, and even going to the extreme of 
having the surface of the stucco skim-coated to conceal cracks. If 
the Maacks checked each and every one of Ms. Kesselring's 
representations, and after going through that effort were able to 
determine that there was no builder's warranty, they naturally 
would have had the building inspected by a general contract. With 
the skim-coating in place, covering up the latent defects in the 
stucco, the question becomes whether a general contractor would 
have been able to determine that something was amiss. In all 
likelihood, a general contractor would have been able to do so, but 
that remains a factual issue in the case. 
22 
Finally, simply because Mr. Maack is an attorney should not 
change the outcome of this appeal. Otherwise, this Court will 
impose a duty upon attorneys to cross-examine every salesman with 
whom they deal, insisting upon written documentation of every 
representation the salesman makes in a way that only would imply 
that the salesman was dishonest. This would exacerbate the already 
existing problem of the public's negative perception of lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Parol Evidence Rule does not protect Jarvik or anyone else 
who has committed fraud by prohibiting extrinsic evidence necessary 
to prove the fraud. When someone like Jarvik intentionally 
conceals defects in a structure or intentionally misrepresents the 
existence of a builder's warranty, evidence of that fraud will not 
be found in the four corners of the written contract between the 
buyer and seller. The fraud exception to the parol evidence rule 
is well established. The "as is" and similar provisions in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, therefore, did not preclude any of 
the Maacks' claims against Jarvik. 
Jarvik's failure to disclose to the Maacks the substantial 
defects in the exterior stucco of the home constitute a breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Jarvik disclosed 
minor defects in the stucco, while concealing the substantial 
defects that would require the replacement of the exterior stucco 
shortly after the Maacks moved into the home. The "as is" clause 
23 
and similar contractual provisions do not eliminate the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
The Maacks exercised reasonable diligence, but in any event 
this factually intensive inquiry cannot be resolved on summary 
judgment. They were entitled to rely upon Maclyn Kesselring, a 
reputable real estate agent, who is under a statutory obligation to 
avoid making any substantial misrepresentation concerning the 
"builder's warranty." The rule of caveat emptor does not apply to 
those dealing with a licensed real estate agent. Further, the 
misrepresentation concerning the "builder's warranty," although 
egregious is the least of Jarvik's fraudulent activities, 
especially when contrasted against his active concealment of the 
defects in the exterior stucco. He disclosed some, but actively 
concealed the remaining, considerably more serious defects. This 
Court should reverse the District Court's Order Granting Jarvik's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this Court's ruling. The remand should 
include a direction that the case go to trial. 
DATED: March 2, 1993. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
fk/l /?. U,*^ 
fiar^c A'. Larsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Robert D. Maack and Judith D. Maack 
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K.M. Frankenburg, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
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Tab A 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
§§1152 to 1213. ^ R 1 f l . . 01 f l Failure to give notice of application for de-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d by custom 28 A.L.R 3d 1383. 
!070 Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendants right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. —- Judgment «=» 92 to 134 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
168 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
Affidavit. —Standard of review. 
—Contents. Attorney's fees. 
—Corporation. Availability of motion. 
—Experts. Cross-motions. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. Damages. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. Discovery. 
Resting on pleadings. Disputed facts. 
—Objection. Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. —Facts considered. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. —Improper evidence. 
—Superseding pleadings. —Proof. 
—Unpleaded defenses. —Weight of testimony. 
—Verified pleading. Improper party plaintiff. 
—Waiver of right to contest. Issue of fact. 
—When unavailable. —Corporate existence. 
Exclusive control of facts. —Deeds. 
—Who may make. —Lease as security. 
Affirmative defense. Judicial attitude. 
Answers to interrogatories. Motion for new trial. 
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Third Judicial District 
Robert Jarvik, M.D. 
124 W 60 Street 
New York, NY 10023 
Telephone: (212) 265-8172 
MAY 1 9 1992 
(\ SALT£AKECtHJNTY 
v. DtpulyCtock 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. * 
* 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION * 
INC., a Utah Company, and * 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an * 
individual * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* 
MAACK and JUDITH * 
* 
* 
Plaintiffs * 
* 
* 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. * 
Defendant * 
JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
Consolidated Cases 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
ROBERT D. 
D. MAACK 
vs. 
002137 
The Court, having made its rule 52 Statement and Order, 
which are incorporated herein by this reference, hereby enters 
judgement against Plaintiffs for no cause of action, on each and 
every claim asserted against Defendant Robert Jarvik. Pursuant to 
Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, costs are awarded to 
defendant Jarvik in the amount of $ v . 
Pursuant to defendant's affidavit submitted in accord with 
Rule 4-505, the Court awards legal fees in the amount of $ yA 
to defendant Jarvik. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
,. /? A /° _ ^ss\ 
HONORABLE PAT Bv--BRIAN 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
-4f.TL'% 
002138 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on 
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center — 1300 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K.M. Frankenburg, E sq 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
PO Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Michael F. Heyrend d IMP 
310 "EM S t r e e t $21-11 <4£ 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84103 
Paul D. Newman 
Snell & Wilmer 
60 East South Temple, Suit* 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Robert Jarvik, 
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Robert Jarvik, M.D. 
124 W 60 Street 
New York, NY 10023 
Telephone: (212) 265-8172 
III THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RESOURCE DESIGN & CONSTRUCT 
INC., a Utah Company, and 
TIMOTHY HOAGLAND, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
ROBERT D. MAACK and JUDITH 
D. MAACK 
Plaintiffs 
vs. 
ROBERT JARVIK, M.D. 
Defendant 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
RULE 52 STATEMENT OF 
GROUNDS AND ORDER FOR 
GRANTING DEFENDANT ROBERT 
JARVIK1S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AGAINST 
PLAINTIFFS 
Consolidated Cases 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
Civil No. 900903201CV 
1. The Motion for Summary Judgement filed fay Defendant Robert 
Jarvik ("Jarvji Ik1 ) un or about March 24, 1992 came on for 
hearing before the Court, pursuant to notice, on May 
Plaintiff Robert D. Maack was present and represented by counsel, 
Mark A, Larsen, Plaintiff Judith D Maack was represented by 
1 
ichael Teyrend Defendant Resource Design & 
Construction, Inc. ("Resource Design") and Timothy Hoagland were 
represented by counsel, Kur' Frankenburg, Defendant Jarvik 
rejpi; e s e n t . e d I i i nise I I .niiii ,1! p : , a tec i o"1. »ei' t h e Lu J op lie in , iiin Il 
Third-Party Defendant Eagar & Company was represented by counsel, 
Pau] Newman. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda filed by 
the 
hearing, bases i t s decision on the following grounds: 
2 . T h e r e i •. in |i "iiiiu i lie d i s p u t e w i t h r e s p e c t In I lie toll l n w u n i 
material facts: 
A. During 1986, Jarvik entered a contract with Resource 
Design for the construction of a home (the "Home") located on Lot 
N. 5, White Hill Estates, Phase 2, which was substantially 
completed by August, 1987. 
B. Jarvik entered into sales-agency contracts for the 
sale of the property with Eagar on November 4, 1987, and April 
14, 1988. 
C. Plaintiffs executed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
("Agreement") on July 26, 1988, whereby they offered to purchase 
the Home from Jarvik. 
r
 Jarvik accepted and signed the Agreement on July 27, 
1988. 
E. The Agreement contains the following pertinent 
provisions: 
(] ) 2 (e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a 
visual inspection of the property and subject to 
Section 1(c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its 
present physical condition, except: none. 
(2) o. SELLER'S WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties 
contained in Section C, the following items are also 
warranted; rblank] 
( ) SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. 
This offer is made subject to the following special 
2 
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conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
prior to closing: This offer may be accepted In 
counterpart. 
(4) 11. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE 
INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISIONS SECTIONS ON THE 
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE BUYER AND 
SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY 
REFERENCE. 
P. The Agreement contains the following pertinent General 
Provisions: 
(1) B. INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property 
upon Buyer's own examination and judgement and not by 
reason of any representation made to Buyer by Seller 
or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its 
condition, size, location, present value, future value, 
income herefrom or as to its production. Buyer accepts 
the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's 
warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer 
desires any additional inspection, said inspection 
shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by 
Buyer. 
(2) C. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: 
(a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any 
building or zoning violation concerning the property 
which has not or will not be remedied prior to closing; 
(b) all obligations against the property including 
taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens, or other 
encumbrances of any nature shall be brought current on 
or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, and ventilating systems, electrical 
systems, and appliances shall be sound or in 
satisfactory working condition at closing. 
(3) L. COMPLETE AGREEMENT-NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. 
This instrument constitutes the entire agreement 
between the parties and supercedes and cancels any and 
all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings, or agreements between the parties. 
There are no oral agreements which modify or affect 
this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except 
by mutua] written agreement of the parties. 
(4) N. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
... Both parties agree that should either party default in 
any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the 
defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise <:>] * 
0VZ142 
accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in 
pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable law, 
whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. 
3 Il J 11 i i l l . i t t s i In in I' i I d 1111 in I f l i f ' N 1 i i in p i ' n l e n r t 11 in I I l i e rv 
were any subsequent mutual written agreements between Plaintiffs 
and Jarvik or Plaintiffs and Eagar. 
I Plaintiff Robert D. Maack :i s ai attorney licensed to 
practice law in the State of Utah, and has practiced law in the 
State of IJt Eil: i f- :: i: mai ij years. 
5. Plaintiffs claim that prior to the execution of the 
Agreement, Plaintiffs were informed b} Ma> ::] } n Kesselring : f Eagai : 
that there was a "builder's warranty" covering the Home, and that 
based upon that representation, Plaintiffs did not have a general 
contractor inspect the Home on their behalf. 
6. The Agreement does not condition Plaintiffs1 offer to 
purchase the Home upon the performance an inspect!on or on an 
acceptable inspection report. 
7. Plaintiffs did not ask for a copy of the "builder's 
warranty". 
8 The Agreement does not condition Plaintiffs' offer to 
purchase the Home upon the existence of a "builder's warranty". 
4 
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Following purchase of the Home, the plaintiffs made demands 
upon the defendant's contractor * .. correct alleged defects in the 
Home - t e a c I1 1 i * i»111 r a i • t • 11 in 1 f 1 1 1 n5> r 
claims, stating that they relied upon oral representations made 
realtor that there was a one-year builders' warranty and 
that •• mud i ci 1 repair "work . .. r • • le-
year builder's warranty." (First Amended Complaint paragraphs 6-
12) 
10. BASED UPON the above facts, the Court concludes as follows: 
(a). The Agreement is clear and unambiguous. 
(b) . The Agreement is properly executed. 
(c) . The court finds absolutely no misrepresentation or 
fraud. 
(d) . Plaintiffs1 failure to ask for a C O D V 
"builder's warranty11 and failure to obtain an inspection 
constituted conduct below the level of ordinary diligence. 
(e) . Plaintiffs' failure to ask for a copy of the ""ImiJiiei: " t 
warranty" and failure to condition their offer to purchase the 
Home on the existence of a "builder's warranty" indicate that 
Plaintiffs d^f ,+ treat np representation as material and did 
not rely upon the representation when they purchased the Home. 
m e integration clause of ' Agreement at Paragraph L 
of the General Provisions entitled "COMPLETE AGREEMENT-
AGREEMENTS", is clear and unambiguous, and precludes any claims 
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00214 
I»T -» • I i f«.' mi i iifui i.iitli r e g a r d t o a l l o r a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d a l l 
prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings 
agreements not expressly stated in the Agreement, whether made 
r. 
(g). One of the covenants ~* the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement was to honor Paragraph I Attempts by the plaintiffs to 
enfc . ecjt'i il """"I m
 o r a j 
representations made prior to closing constitute iefault o* 
that covenant. 
written agreement. 
1 
Motion for Summary Judgement on eacl 1 c f the claims asserted 
against him by the Plaintiffs. 
DATED this 11th day of May, 1992. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a tx ue ai id correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid on 
this 11th day of May, 1992, to the following: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Campbell, Maack & Sessions 
One Utah Center — 1300 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K.M. Frankenburg, Esq. 
Williams & Hunt 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
PO Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Michael F. Hey rend # 148 0' 
310 "E" Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
Paul D. Newman 
Snell & Wilmer 
60 East South Temple, Sui te 8 00 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
^ 
xSSeftTjai 
l*^ 
Ja'rvik, M.D. 
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